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The unprecedented level of government intervention in recent financial markets 
has mainly ignored the root cause of the financial institution balance sheet problem: 
housing prices. Rather than apply taxpayer dollars to the symptoms (i.e. buying 
securities), policies directed at reducing inefficiencies and poor incentives in the 
housing market will help fix the system from the bottom up and motivate the 
substantial capital waiting in the wings to buy distressed housing assets. This paper 
proposes eliminating some of these frictions and inducing positive optionality in the 
housing market to better incentivize fresh housing investment at a much lower cost 
than many of the alternative plans included in the $700+ billion congressional and 
administrative plans thus far.  
 
 
I. PROPOSAL  
 
Although the Treasury’s recent moves to purchase financial assets and inject 
capital into the banking system are designed to ease market fears, they do little to 
address the primary cause of financial institution balance sheet problems: housing 
markets. Housing markets are the very foundation beneath all of the headline culprits 
such as collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps and asset-backed security 
valuation. Shoring up the value of financial assets based on housing is akin to treating 
the symptoms and ignoring the disease. Dissatisfaction with the Treasury is focused 
on concerns that risk is being transferred from private markets to the taxpayer with no 
mechanism in place to address the root causes of housing prices and defaults. Housing 
markets are frozen by fear of further price declines. This fear has sidelined both 
individual and institutional capital that is anxiously waiting to take advantage of 
depressed prices. We need a solution that reassures buyers in the wings that does not 
put the burden fully on the U.S. taxpayer and costs substantially less than $700 
billion.  
 
There are about 3.8 million existing homes for sale (National Association of 
Realtors 2009). A substantial number of these homes are either already in foreclosure 
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or in danger of foreclosure. Imagine being able to negotiate the purchase price of a 
home with the knowledge that 30% of any potential fall in price is shared by a partner, 
but 100% of the gain is yours. The federal government could immediately become this 
partner by making all capital losses 100% deductible on home purchases from this 
point forward. This price protection could be initially offered for a six-month period 
with extensions as needed. Home buyers could purchase with the knowledge that the 
U.S. government is sharing the risk with them. To further sweeten the pot, we could 
extend the current capital gains exemption to all types of home buyers, not just owner-
occupied purchasers. Assuming a 30% tax rate, if all 3.8 million existing homes were 
to sell at the current median price and then subsequently sell at a further 25% decline, 
the cost to the Treasury would be $47.1 billion – far less than the price tag on many of 
the TARP programs and other plans being considered. If the market stabilizes or even 
rises, the cost would be zero.  
 
Unlike direct purchase of financial assets by the U.S. Government, this 
proposal motivates private capital and allows the risk to be borne mostly by market 
participants. Increased sales levels and stabilizing prices would immediately result in 
rebounding mortgage backed securities prices as existing mortgages prepay providing 
both cash and balance sheet repair. Mark to market prices on mortgage backed 
securities would rise and the capital crunch throughout the credit system would 
ameliorate. Increasing sales and stabilizing prices would lower the incentive to walk 
away from upside down mortgages and also assist the bank REO (real estate owned) 
market. Delinquent existing homeowners might find a buyer for their property and 
avoid default also repairing bank balance sheets and capital positions. Improved 
balance sheet positions would obviate the need for Federal capital injections into the 
banking system and allow banks to quickly pay back any emergency capital obtained 
thus far.  
 
This proposal helps eliminate the element of fear that has frozen real estate and 
real estate securities markets through risk sharing and risk transfer that is borne 
mostly by the market. Risk is transferred from existing homeowners to new capital 
able to make this decision with full market knowledge and choice. Further, this risk 
transfer is fully transparent, open to all market participants and does not involve high 
levels of implicit leverage unlike the Public Private Investment Fund (PPIF) recently 
proposed by the Treasury which allows for 6:1 leverage by private investors using 
public money. This proposal would likely ameliorate (although not fully eliminate) 
the possibility of risk shifting by investors relative to other proposals such as the PPIF 
since any leverage employed would be provided by the private sector. Moreover, 
current market conditions would naturally regulate the credit process and leverage 
employed by buyers of real estate. The proposal could go into effect immediately and 
have immediate effects on market behavior. Most importantly, if housing markets do 
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stabilize, the cost to the Treasury could be much, much lower and the need to 
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